A coalition of famers, seed sellers, and agricultural organizations that challenged Monsanto’s patents on genetically-modified seeds is appealing a decision of the Federal Circuit on June 10, 2013 to the U.S. Supreme Court in Organic Seed Growers and Trade Asss’n v. Monsanto Co. (The petition for a writ of certiorari may be found here). The plaintiffs filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a ruling of non-infringement and invalidity of Monsanto’s genetically modified seed patents. These are the same patents that Monsanto successfully enforced in Bowman v. Monsanto, which was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on May 13, 2013. The Federal Circuit held that there was no justiciable case or controversy because Monsanto had made binding assurances that it would not take legal action against growers whose crops might inadvertently contain traces of Monsanto biotech genes, and the plaintiffs fell within this group.
A recent decision from the Ninth Circuit in Kimble v. Marvel Enterprises Inc., No. 11-15605, highlights the problems parties can have when they enter into license agreements involving patents where the royalty payments extend beyond the life of the patents. In general, hybrid licensing agreements (those having inseparable patent and non-patent fights) are unenforceable beyond the expiration date of the patent unless either (a) there is a discounted royalty rate after the expiration date or (b) there is some clear indication that the royalty rate was not driven by leverage created by the patent rights. See Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964). The rationale is that to hold otherwise would improperly extend the lifetime of the patent.
In Kimble, the inventor met with Marvel about his patented idea for a toy that children could use to mimic Spider-Man’s ability to shoot webs from his hands by shooting foam string from a glove. Kimble claimed the parties reached an oral agreement that Marvel would compensate Kimble if it used his ideas. Marvel then created a toy called the “Web Blaster” that was similar to what Kimble suggested. Marvel did not compensate Kimble, however.
Kimble sued for both patent infringement and breach of contract. The parties ultimately settled the case, with Marvel paying a lump sum to Kimble along with a perpetual 3% royalty on Marvel’s sales of these products. Eventually, the parties had a falling out regarding what products were covered by the agreement and the amounts due to Kimble.
The Court found that the agreement was a hybrid licensing agreement encompassing both patent and non-patent rights. Because there was no discount in the royalty rate post-expiration and there was no clear indication that the royalty rate was not subject to the leverage created by the patent, the post-expiration royalties were per se unenforceable.
The Ninth Circuit was not pleased to reach this result, however. It believed that the Supreme Court’s rule in Brulotte is “counterintuitive and its rationale is arguably unconvincing.” Nonetheless, it recognized that it was bound by this decision and that national uniformity on these issues is important.
The Kimble and Brulottedecisions highlight the importance of carefully considering the terms and duration of any licensing agreement that encompasses patent rights. Care must be taken to determine when any patent rights expire, what a royalty rate is based on, and how the two interact. With proper care ahead of time, problems like these can be avoided.
On March 15, 2013, the Federal Circuit issued an order in Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Electronics North America Corp, Case No. 2012-1014, -1015, stating that an en banc panel of the Court will consider whether and to what extent it should afford any deference to a district court’s patent claim construction. The Federal Circuit is determining whether it will overrule its prior decision in Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
The Supreme Court, in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996), determined that claim construction is a matter of law exclusively for the courts, and is not a factual matter for juries (although it did recognize that claim construction is somewhat of a “mongrel,” having aspects that are both legal and factual). In Cybor, the Federal Circuit considered what the implication of that finding would be on how it, as an appellate court, would review a trial court’s construction of the claims in a patent. It concluded that because claim construction is a matter of law, it would review a district court’s construction of the terms in a patent de novo, meaning without any deference to the lower court’s conclusion. This has been the state of the law for some time now.
The implications of the Cybor decision are significant to patent holders and those accused of infringement. As a practical matter, parties to a lawsuit have come to view a district court’s claim construction as a somewhat intermediate position. After all, if the Federal Circuit will give no deference to the district court’s conclusions, there is a significant possibility that those conclusions could be reversed on appeal. Fair or not, the perception of the Federal Circuit among some practitioners is that a trial court’s claim construction only has a 50/50 chance of being affirmed on appeal. (For some interesting studies of Federal Circuit reversal rates, seehere, here, and here). Many have complained that this uncertainty discourages settlement, because the “losing” side on the claim construction issue often feels that it will be “vindicated” on appeal.
On the other hand, by having the Federal Circuit have the “final say” on claim construction, it promotes more consistency and, hopefully, better results, as the Federal Circuit is often far more familiar with claim construction issues than many district courts and they (and their clerks) are often better versed in the technologies described in these patents.
Patent holders are also fearful that if claim construction is not reviewed de novo, an unfavorable claim construction by a district court may be very difficult to overcome and could affect how a particular term is construed in other patents held by the patentee. If the Federal Circuit has the final say, a patentee has more options. For instance, it can appeal to the Federal Circuit a get a fresh look at the issue, or it can settle the case with a realistic hope that the Federal Circuit in a later case would not be particularly beholden to how a district court in a previous case construed a claim term.
Thus, this case will be particularly important for parties in patent litigation. It will be very interesting to listen to the oral argument in the Lighting Ballast case and see what the Federal Circuit ultimately decides. This may, in the end, be another issue that the Supreme Court will decide to weigh in on.
By Henry M. Sneath, Esq. – Chair of the Picadio Sneath Miller & Norton, P.C. Intellectual Property Group. Contact him at firstname.lastname@example.org
Last week a Pittsburgh federal court jury found on behalf of local university CMU against hard drive chip maker Marvell (See attached photo) on claims of patent infringement and willfulness. The $1.17 Billion award was huge by any standards and still faces post trial motions which could vacate the verdict or increase it for willfulness, which the jury found. Judge Fischer could grant any number of what will surely be multiple post trial motions including a motion for mistrial, which was made by Marvell counsel during CMU’s closing argument and on which she denied the motion without prejudice to rule on it after the announcement of a verdict. In other words, she could still grant a mistrial and vacate the one month trial and verdict. She could also increase the verdict by as much as threefold based on the willfulness finding. The article attached below indicates that no tech verdict this large has ever stood the test on appeal. Here is one of a number of good descriptions of the case as it has been written about extensively over the last week: http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/12/jury-slams-marvell-with-mammoth-1-17-billion-patent-verdict/
Here also is an interesting video take on the case. http://www.bloomberg.com/video/david-martin-on-carnegie-mellon-marvell-patent-case-er1U0P~yQXC616MuXqU_Hw.html
This week, the Federal Circuit issued an opinion clarifying the time in which an individual who believes he or she is a co-inventor of an invention (but is not listed as an inventor) must act in order to correct the inventorship of a patent or patent application. Under 35 U.S.C. § 256, the Patent Office or the courts may correct any errors in the naming of the inventors in an issued patent. In Hor v. Chu, No. 2011-1540, the Federal Circuit determined that an individual who believes himself or herself to be an omitted inventor has six years from the date the patent issues to attempt to correct the inventorship, or the presumption of laches will apply. This is true even if the individual knows of the inventorship problem before the patent issues.
The patents at issue in this case involved high temperature superconductors and had a rather long history. The applications were filed in 1987 and 1989 by a professor from the University of Houston (Chu), but the patents did not issue until 2006 and 2010, respectively, due to a lengthy interference proceeding. A graduate student (Hor) and another scientist (Meng) who worked in Chu’s lab contended that they were co-inventors of the two patents. The patents listed Chu as the sole inventor, though. The trial court found that both Hor and Meng were aware (or should have been aware) that Chu applied for the patents without listing their names no later than the early 1990s. Hor did not file suit until 2008, and Meng did not move to intervene until 2010, however. Chu moved for summary judgment, arguing that Hor and Meng’s claims were barred by laches, which is a doctrine that can bar a claim if a plaintiff delays filing suit for more than six years after the claim accrues. Based on the trial court’s determination that Hor and Meng knew of the inventorship issue in the 1990s, the trial court found that their suit was barred by the doctrine of laches.
The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that the statute (35 U.S.C.§ 256) is quite clear that claim to correct inventorship requires that the patent issue first. Therefore, neither Hor nor Meng could have brought the § 256 claim until after the patents issued. Because laches cannot bar a claim before it accrues, the Federal Circuit held that Hor and Meng’s knowledge in the early 1990s could not bar their § 256 claims. Instead, the laches clock can only start on the day the patents issued. Because Hor and Meng filed suit within six years of these dates, the Federal Circuit held that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the basis of laches:
[T]he laches period for a § 256 correction of inventorship claim begins to run when “the omitted inventor knew or should have known of the issuance of the patent,” regardless of whether the omitted inventor knew or should have known of the omitted inventorship while the patent application was pending before the PTO.
While recognizing that this holding could create incentives for omitted inventors to wait to challenge their omission, the Federal Circuit felt it was bound by the statutory language and the case law regarding laches. In addition, the Federal Circuit noted that a different holding could create unnecessary work, given that claims are often narrowed or dropped during prosecution and who should be an inventor may not be clear until the patent actually issues.
The USDC for the Western District of Pennsylvania enacted local patent rules in 2005. The court has also been designated as one of a number of courts in the country that are part of a Pilot Program where patent filings will be monitored and wherein participating courts will establish certain practices for the administration of Patent cases. While patent filings have been rather flat in the Pa. Western District in the last few years, the number has skyrocketed in 2012. There were 11 Patent cases filed in 2011, but this year, through July, there have already been 28 filings, or more properly, 11 actual filings and 17 transfers of cases from the Eastern District of Texas, or which relate to those transferred cases.
These latter 17 cases have related to the same or similar patents held by a company called Maxim Integrated Products, which is suing numerous big name companies, and which is being sued in declaratory judgment actions by many other big name companies. Many of their suits were filed, not surprisingly in Texas Eastern, but were transferred to Pa. Western.
Declaratory Judgment actions followed and have been filed here by other companies whom Maxim allegedly threatened with suit. The patent (s) at issue relate to the transfer of “cash” between secure devices (eg: mobile to mobile). The Summary of the Invention in this ‘510 patent is set forth as:
“The present invention is an apparatus, system and method for communicating a cash equivalent electronically to and from a portable module. The portable module can be used as a cash equivalent when buying products and services in the market place. The present invention comprises a portable module that can communicate to a secure module via a microprocessor based device. The portable module can be carried by a consumer, filled with electronic money at an add-money station, and be debited by a merchant when a product or service is purchased by the consumer. As a result of a purchase, the merchant’s cash drawer will indicate an increase in cash value.”
We will follow these cases and report more in the future.
As reported earlier, the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania was chosen to be one of 14 District Courts nationwide to participate in a 10-year Patent Pilot Program to study the effects of providing specialized patent judges on patent litigation. On October 12, 2011, the Court issued an order setting forth the procedures it will use in implementing this program. Among other things, the Court identified four judges who are designated as the official Designated Patent Judges for the Court:
Under the Court’s guidelines, patent cases are still randomly assigned to all Judges in the District, regardless of whether they are Designated Patent Judges. However, a non-Designated Patent Judge has the option of declining the case. If he or she does so, the case will be randomly reassigned to one of the Designated Patent Judges.
Since the Court’s implementing order, it has added twonew Designated Patent Judges:
What constitutes patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 has been a topic of keen interest, especially since the Supreme Court issued its decision in Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) that rejected the Federal Circuit’s machine-or-transformation test. On Tuesday, the Federal Circuit further clarified what can be patented, affirming a rejection under § 101 of a claim for detecting fraud in credit card transactions over the internet. Written by Judge Dyk, the unanimous decision in CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc. (Case No. 2009-1358) found that claims involving mental processes that can performed by the human mind are not patent eligible.
The Underlying Claims
Two claims were at issue in CyberSource. They both involved a method for detecting fraud in credit card transactions over the internet by looking at the customer’s IP address. The claims were very broad with no specific algorithms for identifying fraud claimed.
The first was a method claim with no linkage to any physical structures:
3. A method for verifying the validity of a credit card transaction over the Internet comprising the steps of:
obtaining information about other transactions that have utilized an Internet address that is identified with the [ ] credit card transaction;
constructing a map of credit card numbers based upon the other transactions and;
utilizing the map of credit card numbers to determine if the credit card transaction is valid.
The second was a “Beauregard claim,” which is a claim to a computer readable medium containing programing instructions regarding a particular process:
2. A computer readable medium containing program instructionsfor detecting fraud in a credit card transaction between a consumer and a merchant over the Internet, wherein execution of the program instructions by one or more processors of a computer system causes the one or more processors to carry out the steps of:
obtaining credit card information relating to the transactions from the consumer; and
verifying the credit card information based upon values of plurality of parameters, in combination with information that identifies the consumer, and that may provide an indication whether the credit card transaction is fraudulent,
wherein each value among the plurality of parameters is weighted in the verifying step according to an importance, as determined by the merchant, of that value to the credit card transaction, so as to provide the merchant with a quantifiable indication of whether the credit card transaction is fraudulent,
wherein execution of the program instructions by one or more processors of a computer system causes that one or more processors to carry out the further steps of;
[a] obtaining information about other transactions that have utilized an Internet address that is identified with the credit card transaction;
[b] constructing a map of credit card numbers based upon the other transactions; and
[c] utilizing the map of credit card numbers to determine if the credit card transaction is valid.
Claim 3 Is an Unpatentable Abstract Mental Process
The Federal Circuit found that the method of claim 3 was nothing more than an abstract mental process. While the Supreme Court in Bilski rejected the machine-or-transformation test as the sole test of patentability under § 101, the Federal Circuit began its analysis there. It found that the claim recited no machines and did not perform any transformations. Following Bilski, it considered whether the claim was nonetheless patent eligible. It concluded that it was not because the claim recites a mental process, which is unpatentable under the Supreme Court’s decision in Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). Here, all of the steps of claim 3 could be performed by the human mind using a pen and paper. The Court suggested that if claim 3 had recited a more complex algorithm that could not have been performed easily using pen and paper, the result may have been different.
Thus, claim 3’s steps can all be performed in the human mind. Such a method that can be performed by human thought alone is merely an abstract idea and is not patent-eligible under § 101. Methods which can be performed entirely in the human mind are unpatentable not because there is anything wrong with claiming mental method steps as part of a process containing non-mental steps, but rather because computational methods which can be performed entirely in the human mind are the types of methods that embody the “basic tools of scientific and technological work” that are free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.
Claim 2 Is Also an Unpatentable Abstract Mental Process
Claim 2 required a slightly different analysis. It basically recited the same method as in claim 3, but it tied it to a computer readable medium. The question was whether tying it to this structure created a machine that was patent eligible under § 101. The Federal Circuit concluded that it was not sufficient because the underlying invention was the method, not a manufacture for storing computer-readable information. To be patent eligible, the machine “must impose meaningful limits on the claim’s scope,” so the “the incidental use of a computer to perform the mental process of claim 3 does not impose a sufficiently meaningful limit on the claim’s scope.” Thus, claim 2 (like claim 3) was not patent eligible under § 101.
The Federal Circuit Is Looking Carefully at Software/Method Claims
Inventors seeking to patent computer software or method claims should consider this decision carefully. If the claims simply recite steps that a human could perform with pen and paper, there is a real chance that the claim might not be eligible for patenting. Merely adding a limitation requiring a computer to perform the steps may not be sufficient to overcome this problem. Courts can look behind the words of the claim to determine what the underlying invention is and whether the use of a computer is meaningful. As always, careful claim drafting is very important if an inventor wants to obtain and enforce his or her patent.
In the CBT Flint Partners, LLC v. Return Path, Inc.decision last week (No. 2010-1202, -1203), the Federal Circuit considered when a court can rewrite a claim during litigation to fix mistakes in drafting. The Court concluded that a district court has the authority to rewrite claims to correct obvious errors even if there are multiple ways to “fix” the claim, as long as all the possible solutions leave the claim with the same scope and meaning.
The Claim at Issue
The patent at issue in CBT Flint involved an e-mail spam filtering system. One of the claim limitations required a computer to detect and analyze an e-mail. The patent drafters forgot the word “and” between these words, which led to problems. The claim at issue (with the problematic term highlighted) read:
13. An apparatus for determining whether a sending party sending an electronic mail communication directed to an intended receiving party is an authorized sending party, the apparatus comprising:
a computer in communication with a network, the computer being programmed to detect analyze the electronic mail communication sent by the sending party to determine whether or not the sending party is an authorized sending party or an unauthorized sending party, and wherein authorized sending parties are parties for whom an agreement to pay an advertising fee in return for allowing an electronic mail communication sent by the sending party to be forwarded over the network to an electronic mail address associated with the in-tended receiving party has been made.
The district court determined that there were three possible ways to fix this problem—(1) remove the word “detect”; (2) remove the word “analyze”; or (3) add the word “and” between the words “detect” and “analyze.” Because it felt that it was debatable which solution should be used, it concluded it lacked the authority to rewrite the claim. Thus, it found the claim indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant. The Federal Circuit reversed.
Case Law History for Rewriting Claims
The Federal Circuit noted that courts have long had the power to fix obvious drafting mistakes, citing to the Supreme Court’s decision in I.T.S. Rubber Co. v. Essex Rubber Co., 272 U.S. 429, 442 (1926). The Court further noted that it held in Novo Industries L.P. v. Micro Molds Corp., 350 F.3d 1348, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2003) that“[a] district court can correct a patent only if (1) the correction is not subject to reasonable debate based on consideration of the claim language and the specification and (2) the prosecution history does not suggest a different interpretation of the claims.”
The Court determined that the district court erred because the three alternative solutions it was considering were not meaningfully different when viewed from the perspective of one skilled in the art. The concepts of “detecting” and “analyzing” were implicit in the rest of the claim, even if one of these terms was explicitly deleted. Thus, the scope and meaning of the claim were the same regardless of which solution the district court could have adopted. In these situations, the district court does have the authority to fix this kind of obvious mistake.
Practice Pointers and Takeaways From This Case
While this case suggests that courts are willing to bail out patentees and fix mistakes in claims during litigation, patentees should not rely on courts fixing their problems for them. In this particular case, the Federal Circuit found that the three possible solutions were all functionally identical. That will not always be the case, and, it is far more likely it will not be the case.
Obviously, the best practice is not to make mistakes in the first place, but that is often easier said than done. Patentees should be especially vigilant about reviewing the claims during prosecution to make sure that there are no mistakes. In addition, patentees should make sure to review the final, published version from the Patent Office, as mistakes sometimes do happen in the printing process. If a mistake happens after issuance, there are mechanisms to correct a patent (e.g., a certificate of correction). Finally, if a patentee is going to sue on a patent, it is especially important to review the patent again to make sure there are no mistakes. Don’t count on the court to bail you out!
The other takeaway from this case from the defense viewpoint is that courts may be more reluctant to find claims indefinite for obvious mistakes or typographic errors. Significant errors are still likely to doom patent claims, but it is not prudent to count on minor errors sinking them, too.
The bottom line with minor mistakes is that neither side should be confident in how a court will react. It may fix them, but it may not. And how a court will act likely depends on some very specific facts.
Contact our Pittsburgh Intellectual Property, Cyber and Data Security, Trade Secret, DTSA and Technology Attorneys at Houston Harbaugh, P.C. through IP and Litigation Sections Chair Henry M. Sneath at 412-288-4013 or email@example.com. While focusing first on health care and prevention issues for family, friends and employees, we are also beginning to examine the overall Covid Law related issues in business litigation, contract force majeure, trusts and estates litigation and insurance coverage issues that will naturally follow the economic disruption of the Covid-19 pandemic.
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