Category Archives: Patents

U.S. Supreme Court Rejects Farmer’s Patent Exhaustion Defense in Monsanto Patent Infringement Suit and Declines to Give Broad Guidance on Self-Replicating Inventions

by: Kelly A. Williams, a shareholder at Picadio Sneath Miller & Norton, P.C.

SupremeCourtImage_1In Bowman v. Monsanto Co., the U.S. Supreme Court held that the patent exhaustion doctrine did not permit a farmer to reproduce patented seeds them through planting and harvesting.

Monsanto invented and patented a genetic modification that enables soybean plants to survive the application of many herbicides, including Monsanto’s Roundup.  Thus, farmers using these seeds can use certain herbicides to kill weeds without damaging their crops.  The seeds are known as “Roundup Ready” seed.

Monsanto requires growers who purchase the seed to sign a special licensing agreement that permits the grower to plant the purchased seeds in one, and only one, season.  The growers are prohibited from saving any of the harvested soybeans for replanting or giving them to anyone else for that purpose.   Consequently, a grower must buy seeds from Monsanto each season.

Bowman, an Indiana farmer, purchased the patented seeds each year for his first crop of the season, and in accordance with the license agreement, he used all of that seed for planting.  He then sold his entire crop to a grain elevator.  However, Bowman also planted a second crop of each season.  Because he believed late-season planting was risky, he did not want to pay the premium price for the Roundup Ready seeds.  He therefore went to a grain elevator, and purchased “commodity soybeans” intended for human or animal consumption and planted them.  Most of these commodity soybeans were grown from the Roundup Ready seeds.  When Bowman applied a herbicide, most of the new plants survived the treatment and produced a new crop of soybeans with the Roundup Ready trait.   Bowman saved the seed from that crop to plant his second crop the following year.  Bowman did this for eight growing seasons.  Monsanto found out and sued Bowman for patent infringement.

Bowman raised patent exhaustion as a defense, arguing that Monsanto could not control his use of the soybeans because they were the subject of a prior authorized sale from the grain elevator.  The Supreme Court rejected Bowman’s argument.  The court reasoned that the patent exhaustion doctrine, which provides that the initial authorized sale of a patented item terminates all patent rights in them, does not permit a buyer to make new copies of the patented item.  A second creation of the patented item calls the patent “monopoly” in play for a second time.  Here, Bowman was reproducing Monsanto’s patented invention, and the court held that the exhaustion doctrine did not protect him.  To hold otherwise, the Supreme Court explained, would result in Monsanto having a patent with little benefit because farmers could buy the seed only once and reproduce it.

Bowman tried to argue that seeds were special in that they were naturally self-replicating and that it was the soybean, not Bowman himself, that made the replicas of Roundup Ready seeds.  The court was not convinced by this “blame-the-bean” defense because Bowman was not a passive observer of his soybeans’ multiplication, having devised a novel way to replicate seeds from the soybeans.

The Supreme Court stressed that its holding was limited to addressing the specific situation before it, rather than other self-replicating products in the market.  The court recognized “that such inventions are becoming ever more prevalent, complex, and diverse.  In another case, the article’s self-replication might occur outside the purchaser’s control.  Or it might be a necessary but incidental step in using the item for another purpose . . . .  We need not address here whether or how the doctrine of patent exhaustion would apply in such circumstances.”

Thus, the Supreme Court did not use the Monsanto case as an opportunity to give any kind of broad guidance on the patent exhaustion defense as it applies to self-replicating products.  This guidance will have to await another day.

Proper Pleading Standard Under Twombly for Patent Infringing Complaints–K-Tech Telecommunications

by: Robert Wagner, intellectual property attorney at Picadio Sneath Miller & Norton, P.C. ()

Federal CircuitOn April 18, 2013, the Federal Circuit issued another decision in which it analyzed the interplay between the standard form patent complaint in Form 18 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). Form 18 suggests that a plaintiff can satisfy the pleading standards for alleging direct patent infringement with relatively minimal allegations. The Federal Circuit determined that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal did not pre-empt the appropriateness of Form 18. This decision follows a prior one (R+L Carriers, Inc. v. DriverTech LLC, (In re Bill of Lading Transmission & Processing System Patent Litigation), 681 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2012)), in which the Federal Circuit considered the same question (and ruled in the same way).

The Federal Circuit noted that Form 18 requires that a plaintiff make:

(1) an allegation of jurisdiction; (2) a statement that the plaintiff owns the patent; (3) a statement that defendant has been infringing the patent ‘by making, selling, and using [the device] embodying the patent’; (4) a statement that the plaintiff has given the defendant notice of its infringement; and (5) a demand for an injunction and damages.

The Federal Circuit further noted that “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 84 states that ‘the forms in the Appendix suffice under these rules and illustrate the simplicity and brevity that these rules contemplate’” and that  the Advisory Committee Notes “make[] clear that a proper use of a form contained in the Appendix of Forms effectively immunizes a claimant from attack regarding the sufficiency of the pleading.”

The question the Court next considered was whether Twombly and Iqbal pre-empted Form 18 and Rule 84. It determined that “as we made clear in R+L Carriers, to the extent any conflict exists between Twombly (and its progeny) and the Forms regarding pleadings requirements, the Forms control.”

In addressing the sufficiency of the complaint, the Court noted that it is generally not necessary for a plaintiff to identify the precise product being infringed, especially in instances where that information is within the control of the defendant and not publicly available.

Having said that, the Court then back-tracked somewhat about the detail required to meet the pleading standards, indicating that the bare allegations required in Form 18 might not be sufficient, depending on the complexity of the case and what would be required to give a defendant sufficient notice of the claims being brought against it.

A complaint containing just enough information to satisfy a governing form may well be sufficient under Twombly and Iqbal. R+L Carriers, 681 F.3d at 1334 n.6. “Resolution of that question will depend upon the level of specificity required by the particular form, the element of the cause of action as to which the facts plead are allegedly inadequate, and the phrasing of the complaint being challenged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 564 n.10 (noting that forms governing claims for negligence require sufficient detail to permit a defendant to “know what to answer”)). And we think it clear that an implausible claim for patent infringement rightly should be dismissed.

Form 18 in no way relaxes the clear principle of Rule 8, that a potential infringer be placed on notice of what activity or device is being accused of infringement.

Moreover, the Court cautioned that mere compliance with Form 18 may not be sufficient to meet the ethical requirements for filing a patent infringement action—plaintiffs must still conduct the required due diligence under Rule 11.

Satisfaction of Form 18 does not guarantee compliance with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. That a complaint alleges a plausible claim for patent infringement on its face and satisfies Form 18 does not immunize a plaintiff who fails to identify easily ascertainable evidence of noninfringement through appropriate pre-suit investigation.

It appears that the Federal Circuit felt constrained by the Rules of Civil Procedure and the pre-Twombly/Iqbal forms. Had Form 18 not existed, the Federal Circuit may have decided differently. That being said, until Form 18 is changed, litigants must consider the appropriateness of pleadings in the context of Form 18, and not just the Twombly and Iqbal standards. Providing sufficient particularity to provide notice to the accused infringer of the patents raised and the acts of alleged infringement is still the ultimate touchstone.

Are Human Genes Patentable?–Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics

by: Robert Wagner, intellectual property attorney at Picadio Sneath Miller & Norton, P.C. ()

Supreme CourtYesterday, the United States Supreme Court heard oral argument on a key patent issue—are human genes patentable subject matter? In the Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., (No. 12-398), the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide this issue, which will have a profound impact on the medical research and pharmaceutical industries. (For a complete list of the issues presented, see here). This post follows up on our earlier post discussing the Court’s decision to grant cert.

In this case, Myriad Genetics identified and isolated a human gene that could be used to help predict a patient’s genetic predisposition to breast and ovarian cancers. Myriad then obtained a patent on, among other things, cDNA molecules associated with the relevant genes, as well as the use of the molecule to  probe a patient’s DNA and to prime the production of the patient’s DNA in the laboratory. (The parties’ briefs explaining the details of the patented claims can be found here). Myriad then created a test that could be used on patients to help assess whether they were more likely to be predisposed to certain kinds of breast and ovarian cancers.

After creating the tests and obtaining the patent, Myriad sent letters to various researchers, informing them of the patent rights and requesting that they refrain from infringing. As a result, numerous researchers ceased working in this area. A number of researchers and institutions filed a declaratory judgment action, seeking a determination, among other things, that the patents were invalid.

The Federal Circuit, in a split decision with each Judge writing separately, held that human genes are patentable subject matter. The Association filed a writ of certiorari challenging this decision, which the Supreme Court granted. Oral arguments were held on April 15, 2013, and a transcript can be found here.

While it is always difficult to predict how the Supreme Court will rule, there are some aspects that appeared to concern the Court more than others.  First, the Justices probed the parties for where and how lines should be drawn about what is a product of nature that should not be patented and what is the result of human intervention. This is the heart of the question presented and what they were struggling to define. Ultimately, the Court seemed more inclined to uphold the patent claims associated with the cDNA, as they involved more human intervention, but we will have to wait to see what they actually do.

Second, the Court  questioned whether striking these kinds of patents  would eliminate the incentives for inventors to invest the time and money in developing these kinds of tests and treatments. There was some concern that eliminating these kinds of patents could hinder innovation. On the other hand, counsel for the Association argued that allowing these kinds of patents actually creates a disincentive, as many researchers and companies will not invest any time and money for fear of being sued (which is what happened here).

The transcript of the oral argument makes for a fascinating read. What will be more interesting is reading the ruling. We expect a decision sometime later this summer.

For more analysis on the oral arguments, see here.

 

Federal Circuit to Reconsider De Novo Claim Construction Review–Lighting Ballast Control Order

by: Robert Wagner, intellectual property attorney at Picadio Sneath Miller & Norton, P.C. ()

Federal CircuitOn March 15, 2013, the Federal Circuit issued an order in Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Electronics North America Corp, Case No. 2012-1014, -1015, stating that an en banc panel of the Court will consider whether and to what extent it should afford any deference to a district court’s patent claim construction. The Federal Circuit is determining whether it will overrule its prior decision in Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

The Supreme Court, in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996), determined that claim construction is a matter of law exclusively for the courts, and is not a factual matter for juries (although it did recognize that claim construction is somewhat of a “mongrel,” having aspects that are both legal and factual). In Cybor, the Federal Circuit considered what the implication of that finding would be on how it, as an appellate court, would review a trial court’s construction of the claims in a patent. It concluded that because claim construction is a matter of law, it would review a district court’s construction of the terms in a patent de novo, meaning without any deference to the lower court’s conclusion. This has been the state of the law for some time now.

The implications of the Cybor decision are significant to patent holders and those accused of infringement. As a practical matter, parties to a lawsuit have come to view a district court’s claim construction as a somewhat intermediate position. After all, if the Federal Circuit will give no deference to the district court’s conclusions, there is a significant possibility that those conclusions could be reversed on appeal. Fair or not, the perception of the Federal Circuit among some practitioners is that a trial court’s claim construction only has a 50/50 chance of being affirmed on appeal. (For some interesting studies of Federal Circuit reversal rates, see here, here, and here). Many have complained that this uncertainty discourages settlement, because the “losing” side on the claim construction issue often feels that it will be “vindicated” on appeal.

On the other hand, by having the Federal Circuit have the “final say” on claim construction, it promotes more consistency and, hopefully, better results, as the Federal Circuit is often far more familiar with claim construction issues than many district courts and they (and their clerks) are often better versed in the technologies described in these patents.

Patent holders are also fearful that if claim construction is not reviewed de novo, an unfavorable claim construction by a district court may be very difficult to overcome and could affect how a particular term is construed in other patents held by the patentee. If the Federal Circuit has the final say, a patentee has more options. For instance, it can appeal to the Federal Circuit a get a fresh look at the issue, or it can settle the case with a realistic hope that the Federal Circuit in a later case would not be particularly beholden to how a district court in a previous case construed a claim term.

Thus, this case will be particularly important for parties in patent litigation. It will be very interesting to listen to the oral argument in the Lighting Ballast case and see what the Federal Circuit ultimately decides. This may, in the end, be another issue that the Supreme Court will decide to weigh in on.

Court Reduces Damages Award in the Apple/Samsung Patent Battle

by: Kelly A. Williams, a shareholder at Picadio Sneath Miller & Norton, P.C.

iPhone ImageOn March 1, 2013, United States District Judge Lucy H. Koh of the Northern District of California ordered that the jury award of $1,049,343,540.00 entered last August against Samsung and in favor of Apple in their patent suit be reduced by $450,514,650.00.  The court determined that the jury had based part of its award on an impermissible legal theory, and she could not reasonably calculate the amount of excess while effectuating the intent of the jury.  For the Galaxy Prevail, which was found to infringe only utility patents, the jury awarded Samsung’s profits.  This was a legally impermissible remedy for a utility patent infringement.  For several other devices, the court determined that the jury improperly awarded damages for sales made before Samsung had notice of the Apple patents at issue.

Thus, the court ordered a new trial on damages for the following products:  Galaxy Prevail, Gem, Indulge, Infuse 4G, Galaxy SII AT&T, Captivate, Continuum, Droid Charge, Epic 4G, Exhibit 4G, Galaxy Tab, Nexus S 4G, Replenish, and Transform.  The jury award stood for the remaining 14 products as well as $598,908,892.00 of the original award.

Additionally, the court denied Apple’s attempt to increase the amount of damages.  Judge Koh cited the longstanding rule that the Seventh Amendment prohibits a judicial increase in a damages award made by a jury.  Apple argued that rule did not apply because there was no dispute about the proper amount of damages, but the court disagreed.  However, the court did determine that supplemental damages for infringing sales that were not considered by the jury because the sales occurred after the trial had concluded was appropriate.  The court decided to delay the consideration of the amount of these damages, however, until after the completion of appeals in the case.

Supreme Court Decides Gunn v. Minton Patent Legal Malpractice Case – State Court It Is

Authored by Henry M. Sneath, Esq.  – Chair of the Intellectual Property Practice Group at Picadio Sneath Miller & Norton, P.C. , Pittsburgh, Pa.

Sneath, Henry 2012 headshotToday – The US Supreme Court in Gunn v. Minton decided that a patent legal malpractice case is properly brought in state court. The court held that even though the “case within a case” standard would require interpretation of a patent and other typically Federal Issues, that “case within a case” is a hypothetical case, that does not need to be in Federal Court.  Further the court wrote:

“Because of the backward-looking nature of a legal malpractice claim, the question is posed in a merely hypothetical sense: If Minton’s lawyers had raised a timely experimental-use argument, would the result in the patent infringement proceeding have been different? No matter how the state courts resolve that hypothetical “case with a case,” it will not change the real-world result of the prior federal patent litigation. Minton’s patent will remain invalid.

Nor will allowing state courts to resolve these cases undermine “the development of a uniform body of [patent] law. … Congress ensured such uniformity by vesting exclusive jurisdiction over actual patent cases in the federal district courts and exclusive appellate jurisdiction in the Federal Circuit. … In resolving the non-hypothetical patent questions those cases present, the federal courts are of course not bound by state court case-within-a-case patent rulings. … In any event, the state court case-within-a-case inquiry asks what would have happened in the prior federal proceeding if a particular argument had been made. In answering that question, state courts can be expected to hew closely to the pertinent federal precedents. It is those precedents, after all, that would have applied had the argument been made.”

We previously reported on this case and will follow for any interesting cases which actually try one of these malpractice cases in state court. Here is the opinion delivered by Chief Justice Roberts: http://tinyurl.com/a474okm

Federal Circuit Ruling: Any Argument Supported by the Record Should be Considered by the PTO Board

By: Joseph Carnicella, intellectual property attorney with Picadio Sneath Miller & Norton, P.C.

On January 23, 2013, the Federal Circuit in Rexnord Industries LLC v. Kappos (2011-1434) determined that the USPTO Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (the “PTO Board”) erred when it declined to consider arguments that were made to the patent examiner but not raised on appeal to the PTO Board.

Habasit Belting, Inc. filed a patent infringement suit against Rexnord Industries LLC with respect to U.S. Patent No. 6,523,680 (the ’680 patent), wherein Rexnord requested inter partes reexamination of the ’680 patent.  On reexamination, the examiner held all of the claims in the ’680 patent unpatentable for anticipation and obviousness based on four prior art references cited by Rexnord.  However, on appeal by Habasit (the appellant regarding the reexamination decision), the PTO Board held the claims patentable.  As a result of the PTO Board’s reversal, Rexnord (the appellee regarding the reexamination decision) requested rehearing and argued that the PTO Board overlooked a portion of the examiner’s analysis in rejecting the claims.  The PTO Board denied the rehearing request.

Rexnord subsequently appealed the PTO Board’s decision and its refusal to review all of the arguments raised by Rexnord regarding the unpatentability of the ’680 patent.  On this appeal, the PTO argued that the PTO Board need not consider other grounds that had been presented during the reexamination if those arguments were not raised on the appeal to the PTO Board.  However, the Federal Circuit concluded that Rexnord presented the prior art references to the examiner and that the references did not relate to a patentability issue again until after the PTO Board reversed the examiner.  The Federal Circuit held that the correctness of the decision appealed from can be defended by the appellee on any ground that is supported by the record, whether or not the appellant raised the argument.  In this matter, the Federal Circuit determined that Rexnord requested on rehearing that the PTO Board consider the other grounds in support of the examiner’s decision, and that the PTO Board erred in declining to consider the references presented for reexamination and in declining to consider Rexnord’s arguments in support of the examiner’s decision.

Supreme Court Hears Argument on Patent Legal Malpractice Case

Supreme CourtYesterday the US Supreme Court heard oral argument  in Gunn v. Minton (No. 11-1118, U.S. Sup) where the issue is the long debated question of proper jurisdiction for patent law legal malpractice cases. For more background, please see a December 3, 2012 post by my colleague Kelly Williams in this blog and to read the Amicus brief filed by the AIPLA.  Read the transcript of yesterday’s Supreme Court oral argument here: http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/11-1118.pdf    The central question is whether legal malpractice claims against attorneys representing the inventors, for failing to raise an “experimental use” defense to the “on-sale bar” doctrine, constituted a question of exclusive state law, or one of exclusive federal jurisdiction and law – like traditionally all Patent Law issues.  The issue turns on whether such a state court claim can create or affect Federal patent rights. Our friends at Lexis-Nexis have summarized the oral argument and issues at this link: http://t.co/GaRLnbwN

We will follow this case closely: For more information, please contact Henry M. Sneath, Esq. chair of the Intellectual Property Group at Picadio Sneath Miller & Norton, P.C. in Pittsburgh, Pa. 412-288-4013 or hsneath@psmn.com  Firm Website: www.psmn.com  Blog at: www.pitiptechblog.com or follow him on Twitter @picadiosneath

Is Discovery Allowed in Inter Partes Re-examination? — Abbott Labs. v. Cordis Corp.

by: Robert Wagner, intellectual property attorney at Picadio Sneath Miller & Norton, P.C. ()

Today, the Federal Circuit is hearing oral argument in Abbott Laboratories v. Cordis Corp. (12-1244) on an interesting issue of whether parties can subpoena documents or testimony in an inter partes re-examination proceeding before the USPTO under 35 U.S.C. § 24.

Federal CircuitCordis sued Abbott Labs and Boston Scientific alleging infringement of two patents. After the filing of the lawsuit, both defendants initiated separate inter partes  re-examination proceedings before the USPTO, which were merged. During this merged proceeding, Abbott Labs and Boston Scientific asserted that the patents were obvious and, therefore, invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). In support of this assertion, Abbott and Boston Scientific submitted affidavits from experts  supporting their position.

In response, Cordis attempted to serve subpoenas through the district court seeking evidence relevant to the question of obviousness. Cordis also filed a petition with the USPTO requesting that the Director of the USPTO clarify the USPTO’s rules with respect to the service of subpoenas under 35 U.S.C. § 24 in inter partes re-examinations.

Abbott Labs filed a motion to quash the subpoenas, arguing that (1) the inter partes re-examination procedures prohibit discovery, (2) 35 U.S.C. § 24 does not authorize the issuance of subpoenas because inter partes re-examinations are not “contested cases” within the meaning of the statute, (3) Cordis required USPTO permission before serving the subpoenas, and (4) the subpoenas were vexatious, untimely, and threatened to reveal confidential information.

Prior to oral argument on the motion to quash, the USPTO denied Cordis’s petition, concluding that no discovery is permitted in inter partes re-examinations. The district court then granted Abbott’s motion to quash, agreeing with the USPTO and finding that an inter partes re-examination is not a “contested case” for purposes of the statute. Cordis appealed to the Federal Circuit, which is hearing oral argument today on the issue.

It will be interesting to see how the Federal Circuit rules and whether it allows parties to inter partes re-examinations to engage in this form of limited discovery.

  • Copies of the parties’ briefs (along with the amicus brief of the United States) are available here.
  • An audio recording of the argument is generally posted within a day or so of the oral argument and can be found here when it is posted.

Large Patent Verdict in Pittsburgh – Marvell Case

marvell_chipBy Henry M. Sneath, Esq. – Chair of the Picadio Sneath Miller & Norton, P.C. Intellectual Property Group. Contact him at hsneath@psmn.com

Last week a Pittsburgh federal court jury found on behalf of local university CMU against hard drive chip maker Marvell (See attached photo) on claims of patent infringement and willfulness. The $1.17 Billion award was huge by any standards and still faces post trial motions which could vacate the verdict or increase it for willfulness, which the jury found. Judge Fischer could grant any number of what will surely be multiple post trial motions including a motion for mistrial, which was made by Marvell counsel during CMU’s closing argument and on which she denied the motion without prejudice to rule on it after the announcement of a verdict. In other words, she could still grant a mistrial and vacate the one month trial and verdict. She could also increase the verdict by as much as threefold based on the willfulness finding. The article attached below indicates that no tech verdict this large has ever stood the test on appeal. Here is one of a number of good descriptions of the case as it has been written about extensively over the last week:  http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/12/jury-slams-marvell-with-mammoth-1-17-billion-patent-verdict/
Here also is an interesting video take on the case.
http://www.bloomberg.com/video/david-martin-on-carnegie-mellon-marvell-patent-case-er1U0P~yQXC616MuXqU_Hw.html

We will continue to follow this important case.